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STOCKYARD A COMMON CAR-

Company of Chicago performed
the services of loading and unloading livestock at its stockyards in Chicago. It
neither owned nor controlled any railroad directly or indirectly, but restricted
its transportation service to the loading and unloading of livestock as specified
in its tariff. It owned the platforms and chutes which were the necessary and
only means of loading and unloading at its yard, to and from which the livestock was shipped interstate by rail. For this service it charged the railroads the
scheduled rates. Appellant contended that, having divested itself of all control
and participation in the operation of its railroad, it was no longer within the
jurisdiction of the commission over "common carriers by railroad,, conferred by
the Interstate Commerce Act, but was subject to regulation only by the secretary
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of agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.1 Held, that the
services of loading and unloading livestock rendered appellant a common carrier
and subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.2 Union Stock Yard & Transit Co.
of Chicago 'lJ. United States, 308 U.S. 213, 60 S. Ct. 193 (1939).
Under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 the rates and charges for
stoc_kyard services are required to be reasonable and the secretary of agriculture
is given authority to regulate such rates. 8 In the instant case appellant contended
that the services could be more conveniently and advantageously regulated by the
one administrative agency and that it was the purpose of the Packers and Stockyards Act to place this regulation in the hands of the secretary of agriculture.
It contended further that the Interstate Commerce Act applies only to common
carriers and that the services performed by appellant are not those of a carrier
under said act. The Packers and Stockyards Act makes an exception to the
authority of the secretary which reads as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall
affect the power or jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, nor
confer upon the Secretary concurrent power or jurisdiction over any matter
within the power or jurisdiction of such Commission." 4 On the other hand, the
Interstate Commerce Act provides that the term railroad shall include "all the
road in use by any common carrier operating a railroad • • • and • • • all
switches, spurs, tracks, terminals, and terminal facilities of every kind used or
necessary in the transportation of • • • persons or property • • • including all
freight depots, yards, and grounds, used or necessary in the transportation or
delivery of any such property." 6 Appellant argued that it was merely the agent
of the railroad and that, as in the case of Ellis 'lJ. Interstate Commerce Commission, 6 it merely furnished a service for the railroad and as such was not a
"carrier railroad," within the meaning of the act; that to be a common carrier
there must be control of the transportation facilities, a holding out to the public
as a carrier of property, and receiving of compensation for the facilities furnished
directly from the shipper. It has long been held that transportation ordinarily
includes loading and unloading.1 In United States v. People of State of Cali142 Stat. L. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 181-229.
2
24 Stat. L. 379 (1887), as amended by 41 Stat. L. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C.
(1934), §§ 1-27.
·a 42 Stat. L. 164-165 (1921), 7 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 206, 210. By U.S. C.,
§ 201, stockyard services are defined as "services of facilities furnished at a stockyard
in connection with the receiving, buying or selling ••. marketing, feeding, watering,
holding, delivery, shipment, weighing, or handling, in commerce, of livestock."
4
42 Stat. L. 169 (1921), 7 U.S. C. (1934), § 226.
6
Interstate Commerce Act, 41 Stat. L. 474 (1920), 49 U.S. C. (1934), § I (3).
6
237 U.S. 434, 35 S. Ct. 645 (1915). See also United States ex rel. Chicago,
New York & Boston Refrigerator Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 265 U. S.
292, 44 S. Ct. 558 (1923). In this case the court held that the plaintiff, whose
business consisted in leasing its refrigeration cars to railroads, was not a common carrier
because (1) the plaintiff did not control or use the facilities necessary for performing
carriage, (2) or hold itself out to perform carriage by publishing rates therefor, or
(3) receive compensation from shippers whose goods move in its cars.
1
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193, 55 S. Ct.
748 (1935); Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, II S. Ct. 461
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fornia,8

the Court, speaking through Justice Stone in holding that the state
of California was a common carrier in connection with its operation of a railroad,
stated this test as to common carriers: "Whether a transportation agency is a
common carrier depends not upon its corporate character or declared purposes,
but upon what it does." And in Adams v. MiUs 9 Justice Brandeis said for the
court: "The conclusion rests upon the findings that the stockyards are, in effect,
terminals of the line-haul carriers; and that the service of unloading the livestock
there is a part of transportation. That the yards are, in effect, terminals of the
railroad is clear." Section 15 (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides in
part as follows: "Transportation wholly by railroad of ordinary livestock in
carload lots destined to or received at public stockyards shall include all necessary
service of unloading .•. without extra charge therefor to the shipper. . . ." 10
In adopting this section, Congress made express that which before 1920 had only
been implied; namely, that unloading is a part of interstate transportation and
subject to the jurisdiction of the commission. A directly analogous service to the
one here in question is that performed by an independent switching company.
In Adams v. Mills, an independent·switching company was held to be an agent
of the line-haul carriers, which is in effect the nature of appellant's status in its
unloading function.11 The company is performing an indispensable service which
is an integral part of transportation. The purpose of the amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1920 was undoubtedly to bring under a single
rail charge all the services that are involved in the transportation of livestock
up to and including the loading and unloading and to bring about the complete
subjection of the transportation charge to the commission's authority. In the
light of this section it is submitted that the manifest purpose of Congress is clearly
indicated and that the Packers Act did not create jurisdiction in the secretary
of agriculture over their services.
John L. Rubsam

(1891); Erie R.R. v. Shuart, 250 U.S. 465, 39 S. Ct. 519 (1919); 2 HUTCHINSON,
CARRIERS, 3d ed.,§ 510 (1906).
8 297 U.S. 175 at 181, 56 S. Ct. 421 (1936).
.
9 286 U. S. 397 at 409, 52 S. Ct. 589 (1932).
10 41 Stat. L. 486 (1920), 49 U.S. C. (1934), § 15 (5).
11 See also United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 249 U. S. 296,
39 S. Ct. 283 (1919), and annotation in 38 A. L. R. 1147 (1925).

